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Abstract—Being able to accurately locate wireless devices,
while guaranteeing high-level of security against spoofing attacks,
benefits all participants in the localization chain (e.g., end users,
network operators, and location service providers). On the one
hand, most of existing localization systems are designed for
innocuous environments, where no malicious adversaries are
present. This makes them highly susceptible to security threats
coming from interferers, attacks or even unintentional errors
(malfunctions) and thus, practically futile in hostile settings.
On the other hand, existing secure localization solutions make
certain (favorable) assumptions regarding the network topology
(e.g., that the target device is located within a convex hull
formed by reference points), which restrict their applicability.
Therefore, this work addresses the problem of target localization
in randomly deployed wireless networks in the presence of
a malicious attacker, whose goal is to manipulate (spoof) the
estimation process in order to disable accurate localization. This
is an important problem since strengthening the security of
current non-secure systems or generalization of existing secure
localization systems to ad hoc scenarios will enable additional
reliable safety parameter (location) to be employed for digital
interactions in more general contexts (such as social media, health
monitoring or surveillance systems). We propose a low-complex
solution based on clustering and weighted central mass to detect
the attacker, using only the bare minimum of reference points,
after which we solve the localization problem by a bisection
procedure. The proposed method is studied from both localization
accuracy and success in attacker detection point of views, where
closed-form expressions for upper and lower bounds on the
probability of attacker detection are derived. Its performance is
validated through computer simulations, which corroborate the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme, outperforming the state-of-
the-art method.
Index Terms—Secure localization, malicious node detection,
spoofing attacks, ad hoc networks, two-way time of arrival.
I. INTRODUCTION
So far, wireless localization techniques have been devel-
oped independently from the communication ones. This is
likely to change in the forthcoming fifth generation (5G)
networks, where dense access point deployment and large
bandwidths are expected to allow for accurate localization,
together with low energy consumption [1], [2], [3]. On the one
hand, highly-accurate localization can bring benefits to both
network operators and end users, with techniques like location-
aware interference mitigation, power and latency optimized
end-to-end communications, and user-personalized location
based services [1] to name a few. On the other hand, it
might raise serious privacy and security issues, since various
malicious attacks [4] or inaccurate data acquirement due to
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equipment malfunctions could be possible to occur. Therefore,
an additional requirement for future localization systems is that
the estimation process is carried out securely [5], [6].
Conventional localization systems [7]-[18] are designed
for benign environments where no security requirements are
needed; thus, they are susceptible to spoofing attacks and
employing them in applications where adversaries (able to
manipulate (spoof) locations/measurements of other nodes) are
present could lead to disastrous consequences (e.g., failure in
rescue tasks, drone/self-driving cars collisions, etc.).
A secure-ranging problem has been addressed in the liter-
ature, where the focus is on developing strategies to verify
that a node is at a claimed distance from another one. Veri-
fiable multilateration, location verification using mobile base
stations, and other distance bounding protocols were proposed
to withstand attacks [19], [20]. In [19], the problem of distance
reduction attacks was addressed, where distance bounding pro-
tocol was employed, together with simple challenge-response
schemes. The work in [20] addressed the problem of distance
enlargement attacks, where a novel modulation scheme based
on distance commitment-verification protocol was proposed,
in order to detect the attacker. Even though the methods in
[19], [20] guarantee high security levels under the assumption
that targets are within a convex hull formed by reference
points and that direct distance measurements are available,
there are countless applications in which at least one of these
assumptions does not hold, and [19], [20] could not guarantee
security.
Secure localization problem in wireless networks in the
presence of malicious adversaries has also attracted attention
in the research community [21]-[26]. A greedy approach
to find the location consistent with the largest number of
measurements from reference points was explored in [21].
A voting-based scheme was also proposed, in which the
localization area is divided into a grid and the vote count
of each grid point is incremented if its distance from a
reference point is similar to the distance measurement from
the reference point. An attack-resistant and device-independent
method was developed in [22], where an attack-driven model
was specified by using Petri net. Both distance reduction
attacks and distance enlargement attacks were considered. In
[23], an iterative gradient descent technique with inconsistent
measurement pruning was proposed. The work considered
mobile sensor networks where some nodes transmit false
information. To account for the possibility of malicious nodes,
the cost function was updated iteratively by eliminating the
reference points with large residues from the localization
process. A weighted least squares (WLS) model for localiza-
tion based on received signal strength (RSS) measurements
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2was proposed in [24], where non-cryptographic uncoordinated
attacks were considered. WLS scheme was based on proper
weight assignment founded on log-distance model, where
nodes closer to the target received large weights and vice
versa. In [25], two algorithms that utilize density-based spatial
clustering to detect abnormal clusters were proposed, which
were further examined via a sequential probability ratio test.
First, an adaptive clustering algorithm was performed in order
to reduce the number of initial parameters, and avoid situations
where local outliers are categorized into normal clusters. Then,
a sequential probability ratio test based on consistency charac-
teristics of time of arrival (TOA) and RSS measurements was
employed to provide accurate detection results. The work in
[26] introduced two attack models based on the knowledge of
target location, namely aligned node location and inside-attack.
The former one exploits nodes that are aligned on a line, while
the latter one disables degree of consistency filtering algorithm
by placing malicious location references inside benign ones.
To protect against these attacks the authors in [26] proposed
a novel beacon placement strategy and a filtering technique
that can filter out malicious location references introduced by
inside-attacks.
In contrast to [19]-[26], the present work addresses the
problem of target localization in randomly deployed wireless
networks in the presence of a malicious adversary, using
only the bare minimum of reference points. The proposed
algorithm exploits clustering and weighted central mass in
order to determine an initial target location. It then takes
advantage of this solution to determine distance estimates
from it to all reference points which, together with threshold-
based keying, are used to detect an attacker. Hence, the target
localization and the attacker detection problems are coupled
and addressed in conjunction, rather than independently. The
detected attacker is then removed from the estimation process,
and the localization problem is converted into a generalized
trust region sub-problem (GTRS) framework, which is solved
exactly by a bisection method. The proposed method is stud-
ied from both localization accuracy and success in attacker
detection perspectives. It will be shown here that, malicious
attacks of relatively low intensity are preferred to be treated as
measurement noise, rather than detecting them and excluding
the respective reference point from the localization process.
This is because low-intensity attacks do not have severe impact
on the estimation accuracy and, when the number of reference
points is scarce, any mildly-corrupted measurement is a valu-
able asset that should not be overlooked. As the attack intensity
increases, naturally, one desires to accomplish high detection
rates in order to exclude corrupted information and enhance
the localization accuracy. Therefore, tuning the threshold to
balance out the performance for both metrics turns out to play
an important, but, as we will see, not a crucial role for the
overall performance of the proposed method. Also, we will
see that the new method outperforms by far the state-of-the-
art approach, which is mainly owed to the attacker detection
step, which has been neglected in the existing approach.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In
Section II, the measurement and attacker models are intro-
duced, and the localization problem is formalized. Section III
Target node Anchor node
Request
Response
ti
tpropagation
Ti
tpropagation
Fig. 1: Illustration of TW-TOA ranging based on IEEE
802.15.4a protocol.
describes the proposed scheme for attacker detection, together
with the proposed estimator for target localization. The per-
formance of the proposed method is assessed in Section IV,
while Section V summarizes the main findings of the work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a q-dimensional (q = 2 or 3) wireless network
composed of N anchor (reference) nodes, whose true locations
are denoted by ai, i = 1, ..., N , and a target, whose true loca-
tion is denoted by x. We assume that distance measurements
between the target and the i-th anchor nodes are obtained from
ultra-wide band (UWB) ranging systems, namely through the
two-way time of arrival (TW-TOA) observations, where nodes
measure the time of propagation of the radio signal between
them, which can be modeled [7], [8], [9] as
ti =
‖x− ai‖
c
+
Ti
2
+ n˜i, (1)
where c is the propagation speed of the signal, Ti is the
(known) processing time of the signal at the i-th anchor (also
known as the turn-around time) and n˜i is a random (positive)
delay introduced by the target during packet interception,
modeled as a positive-mean Gaussian random variable, i.e.,
n˜i ∼ N (µ˜i, σ˜2i ). The TW-TOA ranging based on IEEE
802.15.4a protocol [27] is illustrated in Fig. 1.
By multiplying (1) by c and subtracting cµ˜i from both sides,
the following range measurement model is obtained
di = ‖x− ai‖+ dTi
2
+ ni, (2)
where di = cti − cµ˜i, dTi = cTi, and ni = c(n˜i − µ˜i), i.e.,
ni ∼ N (0, σ2i ), with σi = cσ˜i. For simplicity, we set dTi = 0,
since we assume here that Ti is known.
In this work, it is assumed that an external attacker is present
in the network and that it can spoof a measurement of an
anchor node according to
d¨i = (1 + u)di, (3)
where u is a uniformly distributed random variable lying in
the interval [0, δ], i.e., u ∼ U([0, δ]), with δ denoting the
3(non-negative) intensity of the measurement corruption (tech-
nically, δ can take on any non-negative value, but extremely
large values (e.g., δ  1) would most likely expose the
attacker). Note that, from the definition in (3), it follows that
the distance measurement of the corrupted anchor node can
only be enlarged, since it is physically impossible for the
external attacker to reduce it due to the propagation speed
of the electromagnetic waves [19]. This type of an attack is
even more hazardous than distance-reduction attack, since an
adversary only needs to obliterate/distort the authentic signal
and replay its delayed version, without compromising any
upper-layer protocols during the process [20].
Given the distance measurements in (2), one could deter-
mine the location of the target node according to the maximum
likelihood (ML) criterion [28, Ch. 7], as follows
x̂ = arg min
x
N∑
i=1
(
di − ‖x− ai‖
)2
σ2i
. (4)
Nevertheless, the problem in (4) is non-convex and does
not have a solution in closed-form. Besides, if a measurement
is corrupted by an external attacker and one employs it in
the localization process, the obtained location estimate could
be far away from the true one. Therefore, in the following
section, we propose a method to first determine which of
the distance measurements is being spoofed, followed by an
efficient approach to circumvent the non-convexity of (4)
without any knowledge about σi and estimate the location of
the target node by just a bisection procedure.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD
This section describes the proposed method for secure
localization in random wireless networks. It is organized
into three parts: in the first part, the proposed method for
attacker detection based on weighted central mass (WCM)
is described, followed by a discussion on the probability of
attacker detection presented in the second part, while the third
part proposes a method for estimating the target’s location
based on converting the problem into a GTRS framework,
which is then solved exactly by merely a bisection procedure.
A. Attacker Detection
Because one does not know which of the anchor nodes is
corrupted, all distance measurements are treated as only noise-
corrupted in the beginning. According to distance measure-
ments and the known locations of anchor nodes, one can form
circles, ci, i = 1, ..., N , centered at anchor nodes with radii
equal to their respective distance measurements to the target
and calculate the intersection points of the circles (provided
that they exist) as
pij = p0 ± t, for i = 1, ..., N − 1, j = i+ 1, ..., N, (5)
where p0 =
ai+aj
2 +
d2i−d2j
2‖aj−ai‖2
(
aj − ai
)
and t =
√
k
2‖aj−ai‖2M(aj − ai), with k =(
(di + dj)
2 − ‖aj − ai‖2
) (‖aj − ai‖2 − (dj − di)2) and
M = [0 − 1; 1 0]; see Fig. 2. The intersection points from
(5) are then used to form clusters based on their physical
ai
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Fig. 2: Illustration of finding the intersection points between
a pair of circles.
proximity. The size of the clusters depends on the number of
potential attackers, as explained in the following.
For the sake of notation simplicity, we define the set of
all anchor nodes as A = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, the set of all
intersection points P = {pij : ci ∩ cj 6= ∅}, and the tuple set
of potentially corrupted anchor nodes, i.e., of anchors whose
circles do not intersect as C = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ A∧ci∩cj = ∅},
where the notation ci ∩ cj = ∅ is used to denote that the
circles corresponding to the i-th and j-th anchor nodes do not
intersect.
Three cases are then distinguished: (a) all circles intersect
with other ones, (b) a circle has no intersection points with
any of the remaining circles, and (c) a circle intersects with at
least one of the other circle, but not with all of them. These
three cases are illustrated in Fig. 3.
Case (a): In the case where all circles intersect, Fig. 3(a),
we simply choose the smallest cluster of size N − 1, i.e.,
the closest N − 1 points to each other. One way to do this
is to calculate the Lebesgue measure of a set of points and
choose the points with the smallest measure. These points
are considered as honest points and are stacked in the set
H =
{
pij : (i, j) /∈ C ∧ P ′ ⊆ P ∧ |P ′| = N − 1
}
, with | • |
being the cardinality (the number of elements) in a set and P ′
denoting the set of N−1 honest points with minimal Lebesgue
measure (combination of N − 1 points forming the smallest
area).
Case (b): In the case where a circle has no intersections
with other circles, one only needs to check if an intersection
could occur if the radius of the circle is increased. If that
is the case, the corresponding anchor node is not considered
corrupted, since an attacker can only enlarge its distance
measurement; otherwise, the corresponding anchor node is
considered corrupted, and the existing intersection points are
treated as honest. This can easily be checked by drawing a line
through the corresponding anchor node and the remaining ones
to find the intersection points of the line and a pair of circles,
l′i and l
′′
i in Fig. 3(b). Afterwards, it suffices to compare the
distance from the center of the circle with no intersections to
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Fig. 3: Illustration of the three considered cases regarding
circle intersections.
the two closest intersection points on a pair circles.
Case (c): In the last case, Fig. 3(c), a set of N −
|C| ≥ q + 1 honest points is considered, i.e., H ={
pij : (i, j) /∈ C ∧ P ′ ⊆ P ∧ |P ′| = N − |C|
}
. Naturally, the
condition N−|C| ≥ q+1 corresponds to the minimum number
of points required to localize the target in a q-dimensional
space.
A preliminary estimate of the target’s location can then be
obtained as the weighted central mass of honest points as
xˆ(1) =
∑
(i,j):pij∈H
ωijpij , (6)
where ωij =
1/d¯ij
1/
∑
(i,j):pij∈H d¯ij
with d¯ij =
di+dj
2 , is the weight
assigned to each of the honest points. The weights are chosen
deliberately in this form in order to assign smaller weights to
a pair of largest (on average) distance measurements so that
the influence of a corrupted anchor node is minimized, in the
case that such a node is not exposed so far.
Once the initial target location estimate is available, it is
exploited to detect the corrupted anchor node and further
enhance the localization accuracy as follows. First, the distance
estimates are calculated between ai, i = 1, ..., N , and xˆ
(1) as
dˆi = ‖xˆ(1) − ai‖. (7)
Then, the relative error between the measured distances and
the estimated ones is calculated as
ei =
|di − dˆi|
md
, (8)
where md denotes the median of the distance measurements
di, i = 1, ..., N .
If em > Cond, where em = max {e1, ..., eN} and Cond
is a pre-defined constant from the interval [0, 1] used to
set a threshold in order to distinguish between measurement
noise and attack, the m-th anchor node is marked as an
attacker and included in the (singular) set of attackers, i.e.,
S = {m : m ∈ A ∧ em > Cond}; otherwise, no attacker is
detected. Note that in (8), we opted to divide by the median of
all measured distances. The main reason for this choice is that
the median is a metric robust to outliers as it is well known,
which allows us to avoid dividing by an extremely corrupted
distance in (8). Preventing this from happening is of interest
because the attacker can only enlarge the measured distance,
and employing corrupted distance in (8) would likely decrease
the value of the relative error, and consequently reduce our
chances of detecting the attack. Obviously, opting for the
median of all measured distances is not the only choice that
would allow us to have better chances of detection, as we
could also select the average of the measured distances or
even the estimated ones. However, both of these parameters
are directly dependent on the corrupted measurement, and
thus, extremely corrupted measurements would likely have the
undesired effect.
Note that we could also opted for employing some sort
of likelihood ratio test, such as a generalized likelihood ratio
test [29], [30], to detect the attacker. However, such schemes
5typically require a tuning of thresholds for a chosen false alarm
(probability of detection) in order to obtain the desired proba-
bility of of detection (false alarm), and might require additional
knowledge of model parameters (e.g., noise variance) [30].
Hence, the proposed detection scheme seems intuitive and
simple, and does not require any additional knowledge about
the model parameters.
B. Probability of Detection
The measurement model in (2) can be simplified as
di =
{
‖x− ai‖+ ni, if i 6= a
‖x− ai‖+ δ + ni, if i = a,
(9)
with a denoting the attacker link. The problem of attacker
detection is then very similar to the problem of non line-of-
sight identification [31, Ch. 16.4]. Nevertheless, the proposed
approach combines localization and detection problems (since
in our procedure the probability of detection depends directly
on the solution of WCM), rather than tackling them indepen-
dently.
Let us define ei = |yi|, where yi = di−dˆimd , i = 1, ..., N , such
that yi ∼ N (µyi , σ2yi) and ya ∼ N (µya , σ2ya), with µyi =
‖x−ai‖−dˆi
md
and µya =
‖x−aa‖+δ−dˆa
md
, i = 1, ..., N , i 6= a, and
σ2yi =
(
σi
md
)2
, i = 1, ..., N . Hence, ei represents a random
variable that follows the folded normal distribution [32].
According to the proposed procedure described in the
previous section, the probability of detection is given by
PD = P
(
ea > max
i, i 6=a
{ei, Cond}
)
. (10)
Even though it is not possible to obtain a solution in a closed
form for (10), we can obtain a lower and an upper bounds on
the probability according to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Probability of detection, PD, can be bounded by
LPD ≤ PD ≤ UPD, where LPD and UPD denote a lower
and an upper bounds on PD, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that PD might be enhanced by simply keeping in
mind that the attacker can only enlarge a distance measurement
and by following the procedure in Section III-A (Case (b)).
C. Target Localization
After the proposed attacker detection procedure is executed,
we turn to the localization problem itself. Our basic idea is to
exclude any corrupted anchor node which might be detected
in the previous step and determine the unknown target location
via a bisection procedure, by resorting only to non-corrupted
radio measurements.
We define weights of the form
wi =
1
di∑
i∈A\S
1
di
in order to assign more belief to nearby links. Then, according
to (9), the localization problem can be posed in the form of a
weighted squared range approach as
minimize
x
∑
i∈A\S
wi
(
‖x− ai‖2 − d2i
)2
, (11)
which, by developing the squared-norm term within the brack-
ets in (11) and introducing an auxiliary variable α = ‖x‖2,
can be written in vector form as
minimize
y=[xT ,α]T
{
‖W (Hy − h)‖2 : yTFy + 2fTy = 0
}
, (12)
where W = diag(w), with w = [
√
wi]
T and diag(•) denoting
a diagonal matrix where entries on the main diagonal are equal
to elements of •, and
H =

...
−2aTi 1
...
 , h =

...
d2i − ‖ai‖2
...
 ,
F =
[
I2 02×1
01×2 0
]
, f =
[
02×1
− 12
]
,
with Im representing the identity matrix of size m, and 0l×u
denoting the all zero entry matrix of size l × u.
The problem in (12) is known as GTRS in the literature [10],
[11], [12], [15], [18]. Its main particularities are: minimization
of a quadratic objective function over a quadratic constraint
and, even though non-convex in general, it is a monotoni-
cally decreasing function over a readily computable interval.
Therefore, GTRS is quite convenient for solving via bisection
mechanism. We outline the procedure for solving (12) in
Appendix B.
Finally, to conclude this section, we summarized the pro-
posed method as a pseudo-code in Algorithm 1.
6Algorithm 1 Summary of the proposed algorithm
Require: ai, di, ∀i ∈ A
1: Initialize: S = ∅
//Calculate all intersection points
2: pij ← (5)
//A circle has no intersections?
3: if ci ∩ cj = ∅& ‖ai − li‖ > ‖ai − lj‖,∀j ∈ A then
4: S ← S ∪ {i}
5: Go to step 13
6: end if
//Obtain initial location estimate
7: xˆ(1) ← (6)
//Calculate distance estimates
8: dˆi ← (7)
//Calculate relative error
9: ei ← (8)
//Detect attacker
10: if em = max{e1, ..., eN} > Cond then
11: S ← S ∪ {m : m ∈ A ∧ em > Cond}
12: end if
//Solve GTRS
13: yˆ ← (12)
//Obtain final location estimate
14: xˆ← [yˆ]1:q
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents a set of numerical results in order
to assess the performance of the proposed algorithm, both
in terms of localization accuracy and success in attacker
detection. In the simulations presented here, all nodes were
randomly deployed ND = 1000 times within a 20 × 20 m2
area. The radio measurements were acquired according to (9).
Moreover, each of the N anchor nodes was considered as cor-
rupted NC = 200 times for each node deployment, with its ra-
dio measurement generated by following (3). The main metric
for localization accuracy assessment is the root mean squared
error (RMSE), defined as RMSE =
√∑Mc
k=1
‖xk−x̂k‖2
Mc
, where
x̂k is the estimate of the true target location, xk, in the k-th
Monte Carlo, Mc = ND ×NC ×N , run.
Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) illustrate the RMSE (m) versus δ (m)
comparison for different values of Cond, when N = 4 and
N = 5, respectively. It is worth mentioning that the case where
N = 4 corresponds to the bare minimum of the number of
anchor nodes required for secure localization in 2-dimensional
networks in the presence of an attacker. The proposed algo-
rithm is compared against its two counterparts: one where
perfect detection of the attacker is always available (which can
be seen as a lower bound on the performance of the proposed
algorithm), and the other one where no detection is performed
at all (using all available information from the anchor nodes).
The figures exhibit various interesting information; lets start
by analyzing the proposed method in terms of the choices
of Cond. As mentioned earlier, this parameter is intended to
serve as a threshold in order to distinguish between noise
and attack. Interestingly, both figures show that for low attack
intensity (e.g., δ ≤ 2 m), the RMSE performance betters for
greater choice of Cond. This can be explained by the fact that
large values of Cond make the proposed algorithm somewhat
insensible to attacks of relatively low intensity, and force it to
use all available information (even the corrupted one) most of
the time. Nevertheless, it turns out that this is a good thing
when δ is relatively small, because it does not differ much from
noise, and thus, since N is low, it is actually better to take
advantage of all available information than to discard any of it
(even if it is corrupted). This can also be confirmed by looking
at the two counterparts of the proposed algorithm, where
the figures show that not performing any detection scheme
and using all available information is better than employing
the non-corrupted information only when δ ≤ 3 m. As the
attack intensity grows, the situation turns around slowly, and
better results are obtained for lower values of Cond. Therefore,
although it seems that there is no fixed Cond that is the best
for all considered range of δ, it is important to note that the
proposed method shows fairly good robustness to the choice of
Cond, i.e., its performance does not suffer dramatic deteriora-
tion depending on the choice of Cond. Obviously, some tuning
can be accomplished, but the difference in the performance is
not drastic. Even so, the results indicate that one should not
exaggerate with the value of Cond, which intuitively makes
sense, since this value determines how big of a difference
between the measured and the estimated distances are tolerated
in terms of the median of the measured ones. Therefore,
choosing an excessive value for Cond results in exorbitant
tolerance, i.e., the sensibility of the proposed procedure gets
too low to detect even the most intensive attacks. To us, it
seems that the choice Cond = 30% is the most reasonable
for both N = 4 and N = 5. Now, if we compare these
results (Cond = 30%) against the results where no detection
is performed, we will see the maximum performance loss is
roughly 0.5 m if one employs the proposed algorithm for δ ≤ 5
m, while for more intense attacks the proposed method brings
benefits, and can reduce the localization error as high as 3
and 4 meters for N = 4 and N = 5, respectively. This surely
justifies the use of the proposed method, since even in the
benign scenario, i.e., when δ = 0 m, there is no significant
loss in the performance, while it can bring great advantage in
malign environments with high attack intensity.
Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate the performance of the pro-
posed algorithm in terms of success in attacker detection (%)
for different values of δ (m), when Cond = 30%, and N = 4
and N = 5, respectively. One can see from the figures that, for
low attack intensity (e.g., δ ≤ 3 m), the proposed algorithm
does not detect any attack in most cases, which means that it
treats low-intensity attacks as noise and intentionally uses all
available measurements to enhance its localization accuracy.
However, as the attack intensity increases, the success in
correct detection of the attacker also increases. This behavior
was anticipated because when δ grows, the attack gets more
accentuated which makes it more difficult for the malicious
node to hide its attack within the measurement noise. One can
see that the success in attacker detection tends to intensify with
the increase of δ, and it goes as far as 90% and over 95% for
N = 4 and N = 5 respectively. Even though the success in
attacker detection is close to being perfect for intense attacks,
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Fig. 4: RMSE (m) versus δ (m) illustration, for different
choices of Cond, when σi = 1 m.
each error committed in this case has greater consequences in
terms of the localization error, which is why even in the case
of high detection success, there is still room for improvement
of the proposed algorithm in terms of the localization accuracy
(e.g., please see Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) for δ = 15 m).
Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) illustrate the RMSE (m) versus δ (m)
comparison of the proposed method for Cond = 30% and
the state of the art method, WLS in [24], when σ = 1 m,
for N = 4 and N = 5 respectively. The figures clearly
illustrate the superiority of the proposed method over the
existing WLS one for all values of δ. This result is due to
the fact that WLS does not perform any detection scheme, but
rather tries to minimize the negative effect of the corrupted
anchor node by employing specially designed weights. Hence,
Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) reveal the importance of the detection
scheme proposed in the present work. Moreover, the figures
also show that the proposed localization scheme based on
GTRS outperforms the existing WLS, even without employing
any detection step.
Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) illustrate the RMSE (m) versus N and
PD versus N performances, for different values of δ (m) when
Cond = 30% and σi = 1 m. Naturally, Fig. 7(a) shows
that the performance of all considered algorithms betters as
N increases, independently of the value of δ. On the one
hand, the figure shows that the biggest losses suffered by the
proposed algorithm in comparison with its counterpart which
uses all available information occur for N = 4 and relatively
low δ, which is not surprising since it is the most challenging
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Fig. 5: Attacker detection (%) versus δ (m) illustration, when
Cond = 30% and σi = 1 m.
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Fig. 6: RMSE (m) versus δ (m) illustration, when Cond = 30%
and σi = 1 m.
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Fig. 7: Performance analysis in terms of different N , when
Cond = 30% and σi = 1 m.
setting with no room for error and the attacker can relatively
easily disguise his attack within the measurement noise. Even
so, the biggest loss is less than 1 meter, which we believe,
represents a good trade-off for the benefits that the proposed
method offers for high attack intensities. Moreover, this margin
decreases significantly as N is increased. On the other hand,
for more intense attacks, δ ≥ 6 m, the proposed algorithm truly
justifies its use, gaining more than 1.5 meters for N = 4 and
outperforming its naive counterpart for all N . Fig. 7(b) shows
the probability of detection of the proposed method achieved
in simulations, denoted by “SPD”, versus the results obtained
through the theoretical formulas in (17) and (18), denoted by
“LPD” and “UPD” respectively. One can see that PD increases
with N . This is not surprising and can be explained by the
fact that the localization accuracy of WCM is enhanced as N
grows, which directly influences the detection rate. Moreover,
the figure exhibits that the proposed detection scheme achieves
PD close to the derived upper bound in (18) for all δ and N .
Lastly, Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) illustrate the probability of
detection versus δ (m) comparison, for N = 4 and N = 5
respectively. The results in the figures show a good match
between the simulations and theory, and one can see that the
probability of detection of the proposed method is very close
to the upper bound provided by (18).
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work presented a novel approach for secure target
localization in randomly deployed wireless networks in the
presence of a malicious attacker. The proposed algorithm is
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Fig. 8: PD versus δ (m), when Cond = 30% and σi = 1 m.
based on TW-TOA measurements, where an external attacker
is considered to corrupt (spoof) one of the anchor nodes’
measurements, in the sense that it reported enlarged distance
to the target. The proposed algorithm can be broken down into
three main steps: 1) clustering, in which an initial estimation
of the target location was obtained by using weighted central
mass, 2) attacker detection, in which the initial estimation is
used to detect the attacker via threshold-based keying of the
relative error between the measured and estimated distances,
and 3) localization, in which the localization problem is solved
by converting it into a GTRS and solving it by means of
a bisection procedure. The proposed method was assessed
through a set of simulation results, where it showed promising
results from both localization accuracy and success in attacker
detection perspectives. Although the new method exhibited
good RMSE performance in the considered settings, there is
still room for further improvement, which is clear from the
performance margin between itself and the employed lower
bound obtained by using the proposed localization estimator
when perfect attacker detection is available. Therefore, this
work represents our first step towards secure localization in
randomly deployed networks, with our ultimate goal being
achievement of the performance of localization algorithms
in benign environments. Nonetheless, to the best of authors’
knowledge, this is the first work that treats the secure local-
ization problem in a conceptually novel approach by unifying
the problems of localization and attacker detection, instead of
treating them separately.
A possibly interesting direction for future research might
9be adaptation of the proposed algorithm (or development
of novel ones) for the localization problem based on RSS
measurements, since they are widely available in various
devices. Also, generalization of the proposed scheme to the
case where multiple (coordinated) attackers are present in the
network may be of interest. Finally, location attacks, in which
attackers lie about their true locations might be of interest in
some practical applications.
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APPENDIX A
CALCULATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION
A lower bound on the probability of detection in (10) can
be calculated as follows.
P
(
ea > max
i: i 6=a
{ei, Cond}
)
=
1− P
(
|ya| ≤ max
i, i 6=a
{|yi| , Cond}) =
1− P
( ⋃
i: i 6=a
|ya| ≤|yi| ∪ |ya| ≤ Cond
)
≥
1−
∑
i: i 6=a
P
(|ya| ≤|yi|)+ P (|ya| ≤ Cond)
 .
(13)
The last factor in (13) can be calculated [32] as
P (ea ≤ Cond) = P
(|ya| ≤ Cond) =
1
2
[
erf
(
Cond+µya
σya
√
2
)
+ erf
(
Cond−µya
σya
√
2
)]
=
1−
(
Q
(
Cond+µya
σya
)
+Q
(
Cond−µya
σya
))
,
where erf(z) = 2√
pi
∫ z
0
e−t
2
dt is the error function and Q(•)
represents the Q-function.
To find the remaining factors in (13), one needs to solve the
following integral
P (|ya| −|yi| < 0) =
∫∫
R
pyayidyadyi, (14)
where pyayi is the joint probability density function of ya and
yi, and the region R =
{
[ya, yi]
T : |ya| < |yi|
}
as illustrated
on the left-hand side in Fig. 9.
Due to the independence of ya and yi and the fact that
they have equal variances, the distribution of [ya yi]T does
not change under an orthogonal transformation W , i.e., we
can rotate the region R without modifying the probability as
P
([
ya
yi
]
∈ R
)
= P
(
W
[
ya
yi
]
∈ R˜
)
,
R
yi
ya
yi
~
ya
~
R~
4
pi
Fig. 9: Illustration of the original (left-hand side) and rotated
(right-hand side) regions of interest.
where R˜ = {Wr : r ∈ R}. So, by rotating the region R by
pi
4 counterclockwise around the origin (see the right-hand side
of Fig. 9), i.e., by setting
W =
[
cos
(
pi
4
) − sin (pi4 )
sin
(
pi
4
)
cos
(
pi
4
) ] = 1√
2
[
1 −1
1 1
]
, (15)
the integral in (14) can be calculated fairly straightforwardly.
For the sake of notation simplicity, let us define
W
[
ya
yi
]
=
[
y˜a
y˜i
]
,
where y˜a ∼ N (µ˜ya , σ2ya) and y˜i ∼ N (µ˜yi , σ2yi), with
µ˜ya =
1√
2
(
µya − µyi
)
and µ˜yi =
1√
2
(
µya + µyi
)
. Hence,
the integral in (14) is solved as
P
(|ya| < |yi|) =
P (y˜a < 0 ∩ y˜i > 0) + P (y˜a > 0 ∩ y˜i < 0) =
P
(
y˜a − µ˜yaσya < −
µ˜ya
σya
)
P
(
y˜i − µ˜yiσyi > −
µ˜yi
σyi
)
+
P
(
y˜a − µ˜yaσya > −
µ˜ya
σya
)
P
(
y˜i − µ˜yiσyi < −
µ˜yi
σyi
)
=
Q
(
µ˜ya
σya
)
Q
(
− µ˜yiσyi
)
+Q
(
− µ˜yaσya
)
Q
(
µ˜yi
σyi
)
.
Finally, the lower bound on the probability of attacker
detection in (10) is given by
PD ≥ LPD1 =
1−
∑
i: i 6=a
Q
(
µ˜ya
σya
)
Q
(
− µ˜yi
σyi
)
+Q
(
− µ˜ya
σya
)
Q
(
µ˜yi
σyi
)
+
1−
(
Q
(
Cond+µya
σya
)
+Q
(
Cond−µya
σya
)))
.
(16)
The lower bound in (16) is a union bound, which might not
be sufficiently tight in all scenarios. Therefore, we can make
it tighter as
PD ≥ LPD = max {LPD1, LPD2} , (17)
10
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b1
Fig. 10: Illustration of the suitability of GTRS for solving via
bisection.
where LPD2 is another lower bound on PD derived as
PD ≥ LPD2 =
P (ea > Cond)× P
(
max
i: i 6=a
{ei} ≤ Cond
)
=[
Q
(
Cond+µya
σya
)
+Q
(
Cond−µya
σya
)]
×
∏
i:i 6=a
1−
Q(Cond + µyi
σyi
)
+Q
(
Cond− µyi
σyi
)
 .
Similarly, we can upper-bound PD as
PD ≤ UPD = P (ea > Cond) =
Q
(
Cond+µya
σya
)
+Q
(
Cond−µya
σya
)
.
(18)
APPENDIX B
GENERALIZED TRUST REGION SUB-PROBLEMS
GTRS is characterized by minimizing a quadratic objective
function over a quadratic constraint, which makes the problem
non-convex in general. Even so, it is a monotonically decreas-
ing function over an interval that we can calculate fairly easily,
which is why GTRS is convenient for solving via bisection,
see Fig. 10.
According to [10, Theorem 3.2], y ∈ Rq+1 is an optimal
solution to (12) if, and only if, there is λ ∈ R such that(
HTW TWH + λF
)
y = HTW TWh− λf
yTFy + 2fTy = 0
HTW TWH + λF  0.
Therefore, the optimal solution of (12) is
yˆ(λ) =
(
HTW TWH + λF
)−1 (
HTW TWh− λf
)
,
where λ is the unique solution of
ϕ(λ) = 0, λ ∈ I,
the function ϕ(λ) = yˆ(λ)TF yˆ(λ) + 2fT yˆ(λ)
and the interval I =
(
− 1
λmax(F ,HTWTWH)
,∞
)
,
with λmax being the maximum eigenvalue of(
HTW TWH
)− 12
F
(
HTW TWH
)− 12
.
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